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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION-TITLE 
VII-UNLAWFUL TO USE CONVICTION 
RECORDS AS AN ABSOLUTE BAR TO 
EMPLOYMENT 
The Missouri Pacific Railroad (MoPac) had an absolute 
policy of rejecting applicants with records of criminal convictions 
other than minor traffic offenses. I In applying for employment as 
a clerk at MoPac's corporate headquarters, appellant, a black, 
revealed that he had been convicted for refusing military induc-
tion at the height of the Vietnam war.2 MoPac informed appellant 
that his conviction record disqualified him for employment. 
Thereupon, appellant instituted suit under Title vn of the Civil 
Rights Act of 19643 on his own behalf and as a class action, alleg-
ing that MoPac's conviction bar policy was an unlawful employ-
ment practice.4 Appellant sought declaratory and injunctive relief 
and back pay. The federal district court held that the appellant 
had failed to establish a Title vn violation since MoPac's convic-
tion bar policy had only a de minimus discriminatory impact on 
blacks and further found that the employer's policy had arisen 
from business necessity.5 On appeal, held, affirmed in part, re-
versed in part. Statistics which show that a conviction bar policy 
has a disparate impact on black job applicants and on blacks 
residing in the vicinity of the employer's business establish a 
prima facie case of discrimination under Title vn; a conviction 
record may not be used as an absolute bar to employment unless 
that record bears significantly upon the requirements of the par-
ticular job for which application was made.6 Green v. Missouri 
1. MoPac had voluntarily discontinued use of arrest records as a bar to employment 
after the decision in Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972). Green 
v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290, 1293 (1975). 
2. Appellant's conviction came after an unsuccessful attempt to obtain classification 
as a conscientious objector. He requested and was denied post-conviction review in a panel 
of the instant court alleging the unconstitutionality of his draft classification. He subse-
quently served 21 months in prison. Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d at 1293 n.!). 
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000'e-17 (1970), as amended (Supp. III, 1973)_ 
4_ Appellant also had alleged violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1870, 42 U.S.C. § 
1981 (1970), which provides: 
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right 
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, 
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedingil for 
the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens and ilhall be 
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactations of 
kind, and to no other. 
5. 381 F. Supp. 992, 996-97 (E.D. Mo. 1974). 
6. The instant court affirmed the trial court in refusing to broaden the class to allow 
appellant to represent those blacks discriminatorily denied employment with MoPac for 
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Pacific Railroad, 523 F.2d 1290 (1975). 
Title VII prohibits discriminatory employment practices 
based on an individual's race, creed or sex.7 Though the Act took 
effect in 1965, R it was not until 1971 that the Supreme Court 
considered its meaning and scope in the landmark case of Griggs 
v. Duke Power CO.9 The Court held that the Act is directed at the 
consequences of discriminatory employment practices rather 
than at the employer's motivation in applying the illegal 
standards. Therefore, practices fair in form but discriminatory in 
operation are unlawfu1. 1o The Griggs test for Title VII violations 
is that any standard or practice which has a disparate impact 
upon minorities is prohibited unless justified by business necess-
ity-a manifest relation between the employment practice and 
satisfactory job performance. II While the Court established the 
two pronged disparate impact-business necessity test, it did not 
propound standards for its application to job entry requirements 
other than the pencil and paper tests found illegal in Griggs. 12 
Subsequent lower court decisions have expanded the two pronged 
test by applying it to a wide range of employment standards and 
job entry requirements. 
One of the earliest federal district court decisions in this ex-
pansionist trend was Johnson v. Pike Corporation of America. 13 
Applying a Griggs analysis, the court found that the employer's 
policy of terminating employees whose wages had been frequently 
any reason and those black employees of the defendant allegedly frozen in racially segre-
gated job classifications. Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d at 1299. 
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974), provides in relevant part 
that: 
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise 
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect 
his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, 
religion, sex or national origin. 
8. Section 716 of Pub. L. 88-352 (1964) provides that the Title shall become flllly 
effective one year after the date of its enactment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970) (EFF~:CTIVF. 
DA'm). 
9. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). "The Court of Appeals was confronted with a question of first 
impression, as are we, concerning the meaning of Title VII." [d. 428. 
10. [d. 431. 
11. Thus, a job related qualification is one required by business necessity. 
12. Note, Business Necessity under Title VII of the Civil Right.~ Act of 1964: A No-
Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98 (1974). 
13. 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971). 
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garnished violated Title VII. The court further found disparate 
impact by citing two general studies which showed that minori-
ties suffered garnishments substantially more often than whites, 
even though these statistics did not specifically relate to plain-
tiff's case before the court.u With a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation thus established, the court then rejected the company's 
business necessity defenses which alleged that a garnisheed em-
ployee experienced a loss of morale which in turn impaired the 
quality and quantity of his work. The court held that garnish-
ments have no demonstrated effect on job performance. 15 
The Ninth Circuit similarly applied Griggs in Gregory v. Lit-
ton Systems, Inc., 16 in holding discriminatory the policy of refus-
ing positions to persons with records of numerous arrests. The 
appellate courtl7 impliedly accepted the district court's definition 
of a discriminatory yet lawful job standard as one necessary for 
the safe and efficient operation of a business. IS The Eighth Circuit 
in Carter v. Gallagherl9 took the Gregory decision one step fur-
ther. The plaintiffs charged the city of Minneapolis with discrimi-
natory practices in hiring firefighters, alleging in part that the 
city's absolute policy of rejecting applicants convicted of any fe-
lony had an illegal discriminatory impact upon minorities.20 Cit-
ing Griggs, the court held that denial of employment on the basis 
of a conviction record must have a bearing on the suitability of 
14. ld. 494. These studies were: WESTERN CENTER ON LAW AND POVERTY, WAGE GARNISH· 
MENTS, IMPACT AND EXTENT IN Los ANGELES COUNTY (1970) and D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR 
PAY MORE (1967). The court's reliance on such general studies without showing that they 
actually applied to the plaintiffs before the court is strongly criticized in Wilson, A Second 
Look at Griggs u. Duke Power Company: Ruminations on Job Testing, Discrimination and 
the Role of the Federal Courts, 58 VA. L. REV. 844, 850 & n.8 (1972). 
15. 332 F. Supp. at 495. Wilson, supra note 14, and 85 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1972), 
criticize the court's rejection of defendant's business necessity defense. Business necessity. 
they note, is only meaningfully measured in monetary terms, and it makes little differenre 
to the employer whether additional costs arise from the employee's inability to perform a 
specific job or from administrative costs in handling the garnishment. 
16. 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972). 
17. ld. The appellate court noted that the trial judge correctly anticipated the subse· 
quent Supreme Court decision in Griggs. ld. 632. 
18. 316 F. Supp. 401 (1970). The problems presented by the use of arrest records and 
possible alternatives are noted in Note, Discrimination on the Basis of Arrest Records. 56 
CORNELL L. REV. 470 (1970·71); Comment, Discriminatory Hiring Practices Due to Arrest 
Records-Private Remedies, 17 VILL. L. REV. 110 (1971·72); Note, Title VII-Racial 
Discrimination in Employment-Employers Use of Record of Arrest Not Leading to 
Conviction, 17 WAYNE L. REV. 228 (1971). 
19. 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972). This action was 
based on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and the Civil Rights 
Act of 1870, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). 
20. The district court found that black males made up 4.7 percent of the population 
of the city of Minneapolis, but accounted for 12.19 percent of convicted male felons on a 
county wide basis. 3 Lab. ReI. Rep. F.E.P. Cas. 692 (D. Minn. 1971). 
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the applicant from the standpoint of protecting both the public 
as well as other firefighters, and prohibited the use of conviction 
records as an absolute bar to employment.21 
The Supreme Court further elucidated its Griggs decision in 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. u. Green22 and Albemarle Paper Co. u. 
Moody.23 In McDonnell Douglas, Justice Powell noted that a Title 
VII complainant has the burden of establishing a prima facie case 
of discrimination. He also warned that the Court would not coun-
tenance any employment standard which would act as a "sweep-
ing disqualification" of persons with conviction records unrelated 
to job qualifications.24 
In Albemarle, Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, read 
Griggs together with McDonnell Douglas to hold that a complain-
ant established a prima facie case of discrimination by showing 
that job entry tests favored applicants in a racial pattern signifi-
cantly different from the pool of applicants.25 The burden then 
shifts to the employer to show that the tests are nevertheless 
justified by business necessity. Even if the employer can meet its 
burden, the complainant may show that alternative tests or selec-
tion devices would serve the employer's interests without dispar-
ate impact, thereby demonstrating that the tests actually used 
were discriminatory. 26 
The principal case presented three major issues, two proce-
dural and one substantive. The first procedural consideration was 
class size. Appellant sought to represent all blacks discriminato-
rily denied employment by MoPac for any reason as well as 
blacks allegedly restricted to inferior job classifications. The in-
stant court, affirming the decision of the trial court, restricted 
appellant's class solely to blacks summarily denied employment 
because of their conviction recordsY 
The substantive issue was whether MoPac's absolute convic-
tion bar policy complied with the two pronged Griggs test. To 
establish disparate impact, the instant court examined two sta-
tistical pools: residents of the general area from which MoPac 
employees were drawn and MoPac applicants. Because the court 
found a disparate impact in each statistical pool, it held that 
21. 452 F.2d at 326. 
22. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
23. 422 U.S. 405 (1975). 
24. 411 U.S. at 806. 
25. 422 U.S. at 425. 
26. [d. For a discussion on this aspect of the Albemarle decision, see Bartosic, Labor 
Laul Decisions of the Supreme Court 1974·75 Term, 89 LAB. REL. REP. 365 (1975). 
27. 523 F.2d at 1299. 
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appellant had established a prima facie case of racial discrimina-
tion.28 Citing Carter and McDonnell Douglas, 29 the court held that 
no conceivable business necessity would justify placing all per-
sons with conviction records in the ranks of the permanently un-
employed.30 In rejecting the company's business necessity defen-
ses, the instant court noted that the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC) had established guidelines requiring 
that employment tests demonstrate a significant relationship to 
job behavior.3. Although test is defined under the guidelines to 
include personal history or background requirements as well as 
standardized tests,32 the instant court declined to consider 
whether they would apply to the use of conviction data.33 
The final procedural issue was back pay. Having found 
MoPac's absolute conviction bar policy discriminatory, the in-
stant court enjoined its future use, and held that the appellant 
was entitled to back pay if the district court, on remand, found 
that his work experience had qualified him for any position with 
MoPac at the time of his original application.34 The instant court 
refused to hold MoPac liable for back pay to others in appellant's 
certified class-blacks denied employment because of prior con-
victions-stating that the record did not disclose whether they 
had otherwise been qualified for employment with MoPac.35 
Analysis of these three issues reveals that the instant court 
erred in its rulings on the scope of the class and the back pay 
issue. To expedite the national goal of equality in employment 
opportunities, Title VII encourages plaintiff class action suits to 
avoid the delays of individual case by case determinations.36 The 
instant court's refusal to expand appellant's class to include all 
black applicants allegedly denied employment and black employ-
ees allegedly frozen into inferior job classifications seems to run 
directly counter to Title VII policy and practice. In the principal 
case, the district court initially refused to broaden the class, hold-
ing that it found no question of law or fact common to a class 
composed of blacks who were refused employment and those who 
28. [d. 1295. 
29. [d. 1296. 
30. [d. 1298. 
31. [d. 1299, n.13. The Commission's guidelines can be found in 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607-
1607.14 (1975). 
32. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.2 (1975). 
33. [d. 523 F.2d 1299 n.13. 
34. [d. 1299. 
35. [d. 
36. See, e.g., Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Jenkins v. 
United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968). 
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were hiredY The instant court summarily affirmed this part of 
the decision, stating that the district court was vested with some 
discretion in determining the parameters of the class.38 This hold-
ing seems antipodal, however, to the instant court's earlier deci-
sion in Reed v. Arlington Hotel CO.39 in which a dismissed em-
ployee (who would not return to employment with the defendant 
company) was permitted standing to bring a Title VII action on 
behalf of all blacks who allegedly had been discriminated against 
by the defendant company. The court found that a class under 
Title vn is not defined by employment status, but by discrimina-
tory impact in any phase of employment.4o Although the instant 
court noted its decision in Reed, it nevertheless refused to 
broaden appellant's class.41 The court also ignored its holding in 
Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone CO.42 that one alleged 
discriminatory employment practice is a sufficient basis for the 
court to commence a complete inquiry into a company's employ-
ment practices. 
As authority for restricting the class to blacks denied employ-
ment by MoPac on the basis of conviction records, the instant 
court mistakenly relied on the dicta in both Brito v. Zia CO.43 and 
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. 44 It cited these cases 
for the proposition that the trial court has some discretion in 
determining the parameters of a class action under rule 23 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.45 The issue with which the Brito 
court dealt, however, was the threshold question of the propriety 
of maintaining a class action under the requirements of rule 23. 
This was not the issue before the instant court. The district court 
had already certified the appellant's action as a suitable class 
action;46 the question at issue was the scope of the class. In citing 
Brito, the instant court failed to distinguish between the initial 
requirements for a class action and the factors which determine 
the scope of the action once it has begun.47 The court's reliance 
37. 62 F.R.D. 434, 435 (E.D. Mo. 1973) (motion to dismiss). 
38. 523 F.2d at 1299. 
39. 476 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1973). 
40. See id. 723. 
41. 523 F.2d at 1299. 
42. 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970). 
43. 478 F.2d 1200 (10th Cir. 1973). 
44. 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969). 
45. FEI>. R. CIV. P. 23. 
46. 381 F. Supp. at 993. 
47. FEI>. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1) provides: 
As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class 
action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained. An 
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on Johnson is even more questionable. There, the plaintiff alleged 
that he was discharged for racially motivated reasons and 
brought an action charging the company with discrimination in 
all facets of its employment practices. The court of appeals 
termed the action an "across the board" attack which allowed 
plaintiff to represent all black employees of the company as po-
tential victims of its racial policies.48 The class members in 
Johnson and in the principal case were nearly identical and plain-
tiffs in both cases had made like challenges encompassing all 
phases ofthe employers' hiring practices. In view of these similar-
ities, it seems completely inapposite to invoke the Johnson dic-
tum to bar appellant in the principal case from expanding the 
scope of his class in the manner permitted in Johnson. 
In its analysis of the substantive issue in the principal case, 
the instant court approved three statistical methods for deter-
mining whether an action met the disparate impact prong of the 
Griggs rule.49 The first considers whether the employment prac-
tice in question excludes blacks as a class or in a specified geo-
graphical area at a substantially higher rate than whites, whereas 
the second compares the percentages of white and black appli-
cants actually excluded by that practice. The third procedure 
examines the level of employment of blacks by the employer rela-
tive to the percentage of blacks in the employer's hiring area.50 
The trial court, as the instant court noted approvingly, employed 
the first two tests in making its determination as to disparate 
effect, finding first that blacks in the general population were 
from 2.2 to 6.7 times more likely to incur a conviction than were 
whites, and second that MoPac's conviction bar policy rejected 
two and one-half times more black than white applicants.51 
Though recognizing that these statistics established disparate 
impact, the trial court went one step further, comparing the num-
ber of blacks rejected to the total pool of applicants. The resulting 
figure, concluded the trial court showed only a de minimus dis-
criminatory impact when compared with the percentage of blacks 
in the hiring area.52 
The instant court correctly found two critical defects in the 
trial court's analysis. First, by comparing the number of black 
order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended 
before the decision on the merits. 
3B J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 23-1101 to 23-1105 (2d ed. 1975). 
48. 417 F.2d at 1124. 
49. 523 F.2d at 1293-94. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 1294-95. 
52. 381 F. Supp. at 996. 
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applicants barred from employment because of conviction re-
cords with the total number of applicants, the trial court had 
diluted the actual discriminatory impact, because there were 
more white than black applicants. More importantly, the instant 
court observed that a comparison of blacks rejected because of 
the policy in question with the percentage of blacks in the geo-
graphic area is irrelevant to the Title VII issue of whether the 
employment practice has a disparate impact on black appli-
cants. 53 The trial court mistakenly computed whether the number 
of persons hurt by the practice was statistically large, whereas the 
instant court's numerical determination provides an accurate 
method for establishing disparate impact. 
Having found disparate impact, the instant court turned to 
MoPac's business necessity defenses. Echoing precedent, the 
court rejected the absolute bar policy, stating that no conceivable 
business necessity could justify placing every ex-convict in the 
ranks of the permanently unemployed. Not surprisingly, the in-
stant court refused to apply the EEOC guidelines in deciding this 
issue. The guidelines require elaborate statistical validation of 
employment tests to ensure job relatedness.54 Criminal activities 
and the elements of the socially deviant personality, however, 
include so many facets as to defy quantification. The very defini-
tion of crime is an evanescent thing which changes with society's 
perception of itself and taboo activities. Thus, it seems nearly 
impossible to establish objective, concrete standards for deter-
mining when to bar an applicant with a particular conviction 
record from broad categories of jobs. In clear cases, of course, the 
determination is simple; for example, a convicted arsonist should 
not be a firefighter, nor a dangerously violent convict a police 
officer. For an employer to decide whether to bar a thief from 
employment because of the threat he poses is a more difficult 
determination to make. 
The job relatedness of a conviction must, of necessity, be ana-
lyzed on a case by case basis. The EEOC's interpretation of Title 
VII supports this conclusion. In the Commission's view, it is un-
lawful to refuse employment to a minority group applicant on the 
basis of a conviction record unless the particular circumstances 
of each case clearly indicate that employment of that applicant 
is incompatible with the safe and efficient operation of the posi-
tion for which application was made.55 This case by case ap-
53. 523 F.2d at 1295. 
54. See note 30 supra. 
55. No. 72-1460, [1973] CCH EEOC DEC. ~ 6341, at 4621 (Mar. 19, 1972). 
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proach, however, places employers in an untenable position. 
Employers, left with no real guidelines as to what constitutes a 
job related conviction, must make independent daily determina-
tions. The back pay penalty for an incorrect decision can be 
heavy, and good faith, as the decision in Albemarle makes clear, 
is no defense. 
A possible solution would be the creation of an ad hoc admin-
istrative panel within the EEOC to which an employer could turn 
for determination of the job relatedness of a particular applicant's 
conviction. The panel would hold informal hearings to analyze 
the relationship between the applicant's conviction record and 
the type of position for which he applied. Consideration would be 
given to such factors as the number and severity of past offenses, 
social conditions that may have contributed to the offense, age 
at the time of the offense, and evidence of rehabilitation, 
including performance in previous jobs. Direct appeal to a federal 
court of appeals could be provided should a party be dissatisfied 
with the outcome of the hearing. An employer would retain his 
good faith defense in such an appeal. 
There are several advantages to the panel approach. First, it 
precludes employer liability for a good faith mistake, while allow-
ing the applicant to argue the merits before an impartial body. 
Second, the panel would develop a body of precedent to guide 
employers' future decisionmaking. Finally, an applicant would 
retain his right to bring an action under Title VII if the employer 
refused to submit the job relatedness issue to the panel. The 
primary problem with this proposal is the strong possibility of 
administrative and judicial delay which could prevent quick and 
impartial decisionmaking. 
Analysis of the principal case reveals two policy considera-
tions implicit in the instant court's rejection of MoPac's absolute 
bar scheme. The first is a sort of judicial amnesty for Vietnam era 
draft-resisters. The instant court carefully noted that appellant 
had committed a non-violent crime and had served time in prison 
rather than escape to Canada or evade sanctions.56 The court 
hinted that a person willing to serve a prison term rather than 
transgress his ethical beliefs was, contrary to MoPac's fears, a 
paragon of moral virtue. 57 
The second policy consideration implicit in this decision is the 
56. 523 F.2d at 1299 n.14. 
57. The court further noted that appellant had worked as a clerk both in prison and 
after his release for the city of St. Louis, receiving "superior" ratings from his supervisors. 
[d. 
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court's attempt to promote employment of ex-convicts.5s As one 
commentator observed, the abolition of the conviction bar re-
quires an employer to recognize that moral character is not as job 
related as general intelligence or mechanical aptitude and, ac-
cordingly, that criminal records have little relevancy to one's 
ability to perform a job successfully.59 
Despite these policy considerations, the instant court refused 
to award back pay to those blacks in appellant's certified class 
who had been denied employment solely because of their convic-
tion records. The Supreme Court in Albemarle Paper Co. v. 
Moody 6" stated that Congress had empowered the courts to award 
back pay as part of a complex legislative design directed at the 
eradication of a national evil. The role of back pay in this objec-
tive is to spur employers to eliminate discriminatory practices 
and to compensate those who have suffered on account of such 
practices.61 Any court which declines such an award must care-
fully state its reasons.62 
Although the instant court cited Albemarle in granting back 
pay to the appellant as class representative, its refusal to extend 
the remedy to other class members appears inconsistent with 
Albemarle. Since the district court on remand had to determine 
whether appellant was qualified for employment on the date of 
his application, it surely could have done so for the other class 
members whose employment applications showed that they had 
been rejected solely because of non-job related conviction records. 
The mechanics of identifying and notifying that affected class 
would not have presented any particular problems because 
MoPac had retained employment records dating from 197163 
which presumably contained the names and last known addresses 
of all class members. The greatest difficulty may have arisen in 
the computation of back pay for class members who, on remand, 
were shown to have been eligible for employment.64 Regarding 
58. For a discussion of the problems of the ex·offender and conviction bars, see Note, 
The Revolving Door: The Effect of Employment Discrimination Against Ex-Prisoners, 26 
HASTINGS L.J. 1403 (1975). 
59. Wilson, supra note 14, at 849-50. 
60. 422 U.S. 405, 416 (1975). 
61. [d. 417-18. 
62. [d. 421 & n.14. In his concurrence, Justice Marshall states that "only the most 
unusual circumstances would constitute an equitable barrier to the award of make whole 
relief where liability is otherwise established." [d. 440. Accord, Robinson v. Lorillard 
Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 
1969). 
63. 381 F. Supp. at 995. 
64. For an explanation of the back pay problem and Title VII requirements, see 
Comment, Back Pay for Employment Discrimination Under Title VII-Role of the Judici-
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Title VII's strong make-whole policy, the court's back pay calcu-' 
lations in Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. 65 
may provide some guidance. The Weeks court used as a guage the 
total earnings, including bonuses and overtime pay, paid to the 
person hired instead of the aggrieved party. Should the class be 
too large to determine "who replaced whom," an alternative solu-
tion might be a base salary for the period from which each appli-
cant's earnings during the interim are deducted.66 
The instant court is to be commended for its Griggs analysis 
and in its policies regarding the employment of past offenders. 
The instant court's refusal, however, to expand the class to in-
clude all blacks allegedly injured by MoPac's employment prac-
tices contradicts both the Act and prior case law. Similarly, the 
court may be criticized for its refusal to award back pay to the 
other members of appellant's class who had been denied employ-
ment solely because of their conviction records. These aspects of 
the decision may have ramifications far beyond the effects on the 
class litigating the principal case. Should class composition and 
back pay be similarly restricted in future cases, the plaintiff bar 
in Title VII litigation may be far less interested in bringing suit.67 
Furthermore, the immediate practical effect is to transform a 
Title VII class action into an individual action against an em-
ployer by greatly reducing any sanction against the company for 
its discriminatory policies. While it is difficult to divine a ration-
ale for the court's actions, perhaps it is reasonable to presume 
that in view of MoPac's recent efforts to increase minority em-
ployment,68 the instant court was unwilling to penalize it too 
harshly for using the "facially neutral" absolute conviction bar. 
The principal case also indicates the need for an administrative 
panl within the EEOC to which an employer may turn for guid-
ance. As noted, specific guidelines on this aspect of employment 
practices are nearly impossible to establish. The Supreme Court 
ary in Exercising Its Discretion, 23 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 525 (1974); Comment, Equal 
Employment Opportunity: The Back Pay Remedy Under Title VII, 1974 U. h.L. L.F. 379. 
65. 467 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1975). 
66. See, e.g., Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co., 365 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1973). 
67. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) provides a "reasonable attorney's fee as a part of the costs" 
in a decision for the complainant under Title VII. The fee, within the discretion of trial 
court, is usually based on the size of award made to the class. 
68. In the dissent to an order for denial of petition for rehearing en bane, the three 
dissenting judges (Gibson, Stephenson and Henley) noted that 29 percent of the employ-
ees hired the year appellant brought the instant action (1970) were'black, although blacks 
composed only 16.4 percent of the population of the city of St. Louis. 523 F.2d at 1299-
1300. 
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has merely indicated that it would not accept any rule which acts 
as a "sweeping disqualification" of persons with prior conviction 
records. This leaves employers with little guidance in formulating 
hiring policies, though Congress has placed the risk of engaging 
in illegal employment practices on the potential discriminator in 
its daily employment decisions. It is now up to Congress to pro-
vide an impartial body to which both employers and applicants 
can turn for quick and even-handed determinations in cases 
where an ex-convict is attempting to re-enter the mainstream of 
society. 
THOMAS C. KOHLER 
